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I. INTRODUCTION
In Tort Law in America: An Intellectual History, I made the
general argument that the development of tort law in the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries had been more influenced by ideas
* University Professor, John Barbee Minor Professor of Law and History, and Class of
1963 Research Professor, University of Virginia. My thanks to Kenneth Abraham and Robert B.
Williams for their comments on earlier drafts.
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than previous scholars had suggested.' In making that argument I
employed the terms "ideas" and "influence" at multiple levels of
generality. The argument would perhaps have been better under-
stood if I had more clearly particularized the specificity and gener-
ality of my claims about ideas as causal agents.2
At the most specific level, I employed the term "ideas" to re-
fer to particular doctrinal and policy proposals for tort law ad-
vanced by particular scholars and judges. Examples would be the
"vice principar' doctrine, 3 or the doctrine of "last clear chance," 4 or
proposals for a system of workmen's compensation governing cer-
tain types of industrial accidents. 5 On a more general level, I used
the term "ideas" to describe the starting presuppositions about the
purposes and goals of the American tort system that drove those
proposals, such as the idea that the primary purpose of tort law
should be to compensate injured persons, or the competing idea that
its primary purpose should be to deter or to punish risky conduct. 6
At a still higher level of abstraction, I used the term "ideas"
to refer to broad conceptions of law, as embodied in competing ju-
risprudential "schools" that surfaced in the American legal profes-
sion in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Examples of
those "schools" include what I called "conceptualism," which treated
law as the embodiment of universal principles of civil conduct rep-
resented in the concepts that were embedded in legal doctrines;
"realism," which equated law with the current doctrines and poli-
cies that courts believed had the greatest functional efficacy; and
"neoconceptualism," which revived an image of law, including tort
law, as ordered by comprehensive principles, the source of which
was no longer immanent universal truths but general insights
about human behavior drawn from other scholarly disciplines.
Finally, I used the term "ideas" to refer to changing percep-
tions of the sources of human knowledge in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, a span of time in which human-oriented mod-
1. See generally G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY
(1980).
2. Some reviewers of Tort Law in America suggested that I was advancing a deterministic
view of the influence on ideas, in which no particular set of ideas could hope to transcend its
particular historical context, while others suggested that my methodology was "idealist," privi-
leging ideas over material factors as significant causal factors in history. See, e.g., Jay M. Foin-
man, The Role of Ideas in Legal History, 78 MICH. L. REV. 722 (1980); Peter R. Teachout, Book
Review, 67 VA. L. REV. 815 (1981).
3. WHITE, supra note 1, at 51-55.
4. Id. at 45-50.
5. Id. at 38.
6. Id. at 147-53, 237-39.
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els for explaining and controlling change in the natural and social
worlds, centering on forms of scientific inquiry, replaced externally-
oriented models, centered on religious, natural, or historical forces.
7
My different uses of the term "ideas" were not accompanied
by an explicit theory of the causal relationships among the sets of
ideas I described. Instead I drew the general conclusion that all of
those sets of ideas "influenced" the course of tort law in nineteenth-
and twentieth-century America. I continue to agree with that con-
clusion, but in this Essay, which surveys developments in tort law
in the last two decades of the twentieth century, I want to particu-
larize what I mean by ideas and their influence.
The sets of ideas I described in Tort Law in America can be
thought of as causally connected, and their relative specificity and
generality can be taken as signaling their place in a hierarchy of
causal influence. The more general and abstract the ideas, the
greater causal force they have. This causal hierarchy may seem
problematic because the most easily discernable examples of ideas
altering the course of tort law involve ideas in their most specific
manifestations, doctrines and policies embodied in judicial or leg-
islative decisions. But although this evidence of influence can read-
ily be traced, it cannot be explained without resort to inquiries that
involve higher levels of abstraction. In asking why a particular doc-
trinal or policy change seemed attractive to scholars, courts, and
legislatures, we turn to larger ideas: starting presuppositions about
the purposes of tort law driving those changes, conceptions of law
animating those starting presuppositions, and, ultimately, assump-
tions about how humans make sense of their experience and of law
as a mechanism for human-directed governance of that experience.
At this point, at a level of abstraction where the Palsgraf
case comes to be seen as an illustration of altered theories of causal
agency in the universe, 8 some may think the term "ideas" has be-
7. Id. at 23-26, 238-39.
8. One could see both the majority and dissenting opinions in Palsgraf u. Long Island R.R.
Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928), as reflecting an altered view of the methodology for determining
legal responsibility in cases where the issue involves a causal connection between negligent
conduct and injury. Both opinions jettison the physical model of "proximate causation," based on
an external, relatively fixed conception of "remote" and "proximate" physical propinquity, derived
from the natural world, for a legal model, to be administered by human judges and juries. In
Cardozo's majority opinion, physical "proximate cause" cases become "duty" cases, with "duty to
be determined by the judge or jury's weighing of the risks of a defendant's conduct and the rela-
tionship between that defendant and an injured plaintif. Se id. at 99-101. In Andrews' dissent
"proximate cause" becomes "legal cause," an issue of legal policy. See id. at 101-15 (Andrews, J.,
dissenting). Physically derived models of causation, for Andrews, can not be definitively deter-
mined because casual connections are potentially infinite: humans charged with making deci-
sions in legal cases simply have to draw lines. Cf. WHTE, supra note 1, at 96-101.
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come too all-encompassing to be helpful. It may seem more satisfy-
ing, if one is interested in the influence of ideas on tort law, care-
fully to compare, say, the arguments for strict liability in defective
products assembled in Prosser's 1941 treatise with those advanced
by Traynor in his concurrence in Escola v. Coca Cola.9 But ulti-
mately, in investigating Prosser's influence on Traynor, one needs
to determine why Prosser was himself attracted to strict liability;
why his arguments resonated with Traynor; why they both thought
strict liability superior, in some respects, to negligence in the prod-
ucts liability area; why they thought judges were appropriate per-
sons to change products liability rules; why tort law was generally
taken to be a good mechanism for compensating persons injured by
defective products; why such persons were taken as deserving of
compensation; and why humans were regarded as capable of re-
dressing fortuitous injuries to other humans caused by unforesee-
able defects in products placed on the market.
In the interest of sparing readers too much detail and too
much abstraction, I will not be making an extended investigation of
each of the sets of ideas potentially implicated in developments in
tort law between 1980 and 2000. But my survey reflects the above
particularization of my general arguments about ideas and their
influence on tort law in two respects.
First, I have treated trends in academic theory and doctrinal
trends as parallel developments, rather than searching for evidence
of the specific influence of scholars on courts. This is not just be-
cause, as we will see, the kind of academic-judicial symbiosis illus-
trated by Prosser and Traynor has been much rarer in the late
twentieth century. It is also because demonstrating that a judicial
decision drew upon a work of scholarship only begins the process of
determining influence.
Second, I have looked beyond particular parallels between
scholarship and doctrine towards larger trends in the history of le-
gal education, and in late twentieth-century American culture gen-
erally, which might help explain the parallels. In the process of
broadening the search for explanations of parallel trends, I have
asked not just what ideas were accepted but what ideas were im-
plicitly rejected, and what doctrinal and policy choices were not
made. The defining jurisprudential tendency in tort law in the last
twenty years of the twentieth century, I conclude, has been the per-
9. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440-45 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., con-
curring); WHITE, supra note 1, at 198-200.
1340 [Vol. 54:3:1337
PERSISTENCE OF NEGLIGENCE
sistence of negligence theory and doctrine. The persistence of a
negligence-based model of tort liability has been reflected not only
in judicial decisions, but also in the congeniality of that model with
the dominant academic theories of the period, welfare economics
and corrective justice. In seeking to explain this tendency I have
asked what starting assumptions the negligence-based model
shares with those theories as well as what alternative assumptions
have been rejected in the persistence of a negligence-centered tort
regime. Finally, I have sought to explain why I find the tendency
unexpected.
In my judgment, the influence of ideas on tort law in the last
two decades is not as readily illustrated by specific comparisons
between scholarly writings and judicial opinions as in some of the
earlier periods I examined in Tort Law in America. In part, this
may simply be a product of altered definitions of the enterprise of
legal scholarship, which have moved scholars away from earlier
generations' preoccupation with doctrinal analysis and synthesis.
But it may also be because the question of scholarly influence on
doctrinal developments is more complicated than linear compari-
sons between academic writing and judicial opinions might suggest.
Thus, this survey does not undertake detailed comparisons of par-
ticular academic writings with particular judicial decisions, and its
conclusions about influence may appear to verge on the metaphysi-
cal. But its emphasis on the future foreseen in the 1970s, the future
that did not happen, is designed to suggest that if one broadens the
history of late twentieth-century tort law to include prospective
academic and doctrinal developments that were widely anticipated
but did not occur, one gets a powerful sense that the parallel devel-
opments that did occur, even though unexpected, were destined to
take place. They were destined to take place because Americans,
collectively if not universally, changed the direction of their think-
ing about government, free markets, and the role of risk and injury
in the late twentieth century. The negligence model unexpectedly
persisted in tort law because one set of connected ideas about those
subjects came to appear more attractive than another set.
II. DEVELOPMENTS IN TORT LAW, 1980-2000
A. Trends in Academic Theory
The direction of torts scholarship in the last two decades of
the twentieth century can be placed in bold relief if one recalls what
a member of the community of torts scholars in the 1970s might
2001] 1341
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have predicted as the theoretical and doctrinal course of tort law for
the rest of the century. That scholar's predictions would have been
affected by three elements of his or her context. One element would
have been an awareness of the strong tradition among torts schol-
ars and scholars in other fields of law which associated influential
legal scholarship with syntheses of existing doctrinal developments,
accompanied by proposals for "law reform," implicitly defined as the
reorganization of doctrine to conform to particular policy impera-
tives. That scholar would have been aware that the most visible
torts scholars of the last thirty years-Leon Green, Fleming James,
Page and Robert Keeton, John Wade, and most conspicuously Wil-
liam Prosser-had engaged in that form of scholarship. 10
Second, the hypothetical torts scholar would have been
aware of the emergence, in a period stretching from the 1940s
through the 1960s, of theories of tort liability based on alternatives
to the negligence model. Those theories had produced legislation
replacing traditional tort liability with a system of workmen's com-
pensation for job-related injuries in some industries, academic lit-
erature" and judicial decisions endorsing "strict" (non fault-based)
tort liability for abnormally dangerous activities and defective
products, 12 and proposals for "no-fault" automobile accident com-
pensation.'3 A recent article has characterized these theories as
propounding a model of "enterprise liability" for injuries, in which
certain enterprises or industries engaged in risky activities, or the
manufacture, design, or distribution of risky products, should be
assessed the primary costs of injuries associated with their conduct,
10. See, e.g., FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS (1956); LEON
GREEN, TRAFFIC VICTIMS: TORT LAW AND INSURANCE (1958); LEON GREEN ET AL., CASES ON THE
LAW OF TORTS (1957); ROBERT E. KEETON, COMPENSATION SYSTEMS: THE SEARCH FOR A VIABLE
ALTERNATIVE TO NEGLIGENCE LAW (1969); WILLIAM L. PROSSER & JOHN W. WADE, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORTS (1971); WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS (1941);
WARREN A. SEAVEY, PAGE KEETON, & ROBERT E. KEETON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW
OF TORTS (1957).
11. See, e.g., ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT (1951), reprinted in 54
CAL. L. REV. 1422 (1966); Fleming James, Jr., The Columbia Study of Compensation for Autono.
bile Accidents: An Unanswered Challenge, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 408 (1959); William L. Prosser, The
Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966).
12. See, e.g., Elmore v. Am. Motors Corp., 451 P.2d 84 (Cal. 1969); Vandermark v. Ford Mo-
tor Co., 391 P.2d 168 (Cal. 1964); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
13. See, e.g., ROBERT E. KEETON & JEFFREY O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE
TRAFFIC VICTIM: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE (1965) (arguing for the
establishment of a no-fault automobile insurance scheme).
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regardless of whether the injuries were related to their negli-
gence. 14
Finally, a scholar asked in the 1970s to predict the future
course of tort law would have been aware of emerging literature
which sought to assess both traditional negligence-based tort li-
ability and enterprise liability from the perspectives of economics
and moral philosophy. Among the questions that literature ad-
dressed was whether negligence-based or enterprise-liability based
systems were more effective in creating general or specific incen-
tives to reduce the costs of accidents, 15 whether, on the whole, they
resulted in efficient allocations of the risks of injury-creating con-
duct,16 and whether they comported with principles of corrective
justice.17
Taken together, those features of academic scholarship in
the 1970s would have led most predictors to anticipate that the
forthcoming decades would witness the growing prominence of en-
terprise-based theories of tort liability. There was evidence that
courts were developing enterprise liability doctrines. 18 Torts schol-
ars might have been expected to continue their concern with doc-
trinal synthesis and reorganization, and leading scholars had al-
ready endorsed enterprise liability in some areas of tort law.19
Other scholars had become advocates for no-fault compensation
plans.20 True, some scholars were beginning to reconsider tort li-
ability from the perspective of economics or moral philosophy, a de-
14. See generally Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, The Deacadernification of Tort The-
ory, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 59 (1999). Nolan and Ursin use the term "enterprise liability" to include
not only judicial decisions employing strict liability standards rather than negligence standards
of liability, but legislative programs designed to place the costs of activities on those engaging in
the activity through the mechanism of social insurance. Under their definition, no-fault plans for
compensating persons injured in automobile accidents would be a form of enterprise liability.
Nolan and Ursines broader use of the term enterprise liability emphasizes, for me, one of the
central differences between late twentieth-century negligence-based models of liability and al-
ternative models, the distributive assumptions of the alternative systems. For that reason, I am
employing the term "enterprise liability" in its broader sense in this Essay.
15. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OFAcCIDENTS (1970).
16. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, A Cornntent on No-Fault Insurance for All Accidents, 13
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 471 (1975); Richard A. Posner, Strict Liability: A Coniment, 2 J. LEGAL
STUD. 205 (1973) [hereinafter Posner, Strict Liability]; Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negli-
gence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972) [hereinafter Posner, A Theory of Negligence].
17. See, e.g., Richard Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973);
George Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972).
18. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57 (Cal. 1963); Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960); RESTATE.MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
(1965).
19. See, e.g., LEON GREEN, TRAFFIC VICTIt: TORT LAW AND INSURANCE (1958); Fleming
James, Jr., Products Liability, 34 TEX. L. REV. 44 (1955); Prosser, supra note 11.
20. See, e.g., KEETON & O'CONNELL, supra note 13.
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velopment that might have signaled that new definitions of the en-
terprise of legal scholarship were surfacing. Those tendencies were
not, however, inconsistent with an expanded role for enterprise li-
ability. When 1970s scholars had applied economic or moral theo-
ries to tort law, they had done so in the course of making compara-
tive assessments of the efficacy of negligence and strict liability
models in torts, and some had concluded that strict liability models
were more efficient or more just.
21
In short, many 1970s scholars would have been likely to pre-
dict that enterprise liability would be common in tort law by the
end of the century. But that did not occur. Nor did the period be-
tween 1980 and 2000 witness debates between enterprise liability
and negligence theorists. Instead, torts scholarship in that period
took some unexpected turns. First, as legal scholars refined the
perspectives of economics and moral philosophy they applied to tort
law, those perspectives evolved from their earlier status as poten-
tial competitors to complementary theories, each reinforcing-from
different vantage points-the same model of tort liability. The
dominant economic and moral theories that emerged in legal schol-
arship after 1980 were no longer associated with the two sides of a
debate between negligence-based and enterprise liability. Instead
they provided two different rationales for preferring the negligence
model over its rivals.
Second, the interest exhibited by a handful of 1970s scholars
in eschewing doctrinal synthesis and reorganization for more ab-
stract and ambitious theoretical work became the norm in the legal
academy in the 1980s and 1990s. Although this trend would not
seem to have any particular implications for the choice between
negligence-based and enterprise liability models of tort law, two
developments that occurred in its wake did. With some conspicuous
exceptions, 22 prominent torts scholars no longer occupied them-
selves with doctrinal reorganization proposals, or with the advocacy
of alternative compensation systems to that of tort law. This halted
the momentum for doctrinal or systemic reorganization along en-
terprise liability lines that had been building in earlier decades.
21. See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 15, at 286-87, 301-08; Epstein, supra note 17, at 189.
22. See, e.g., VIRGINIA E. NOLAN & EDMUND URSIN, UNDERSTANDING ENTERPRISE LIABILITY:
RETHINKING TORT REFORM FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1995); STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN,
DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW: NEW COMPENSATION MECHANISMS FOR VICTIMS,
CONSUMERS, AND BUSINESS (1989); Nolan & Ursin, supra note 14; Jeffrey O'Connell, Alternatives
to the Tort System for Personal Injury, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 17 (1986); Jeffrey O'Connell &
Geoffrey Paul Eaton, Binding Early Offers as a Simple, if Second-Best, Alternative to Tort Law,
78 NEB. L. REV. 858 (1999).
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Moreover, as the literature applying moral and economic theories to
tort law proliferated, new critiques appeared of earlier approaches
to deterring risky conduct or allocating the costs of that conduct.
The result was a closer scrutiny of the distributive moral and eco-
nomic assumptions on which enterprise liability theories had been
based.
In the early 1970s, some torts scholars applying the insights
of economic theory had begun to use as their normative baselines
economic models designed to achieve efficiency in risk distribution
through the maximization of individual utility, rather than models
that aimed to improve efficiency by spreading and shifting risks
throughout society. Those scholars assessed particular tort liability
rules by asking whether they could deter risky conduct by creating
individual incentives for safety.23 They also critiqued some of the
economic assumptions of enterprise liability in its original formula-
tion, emphasizing the unanticipated administrative costs of alter-
natives to the torts system and the lack of empirical evidence
showing that enterprise liability rules created greater incentives for
safety on the part of manufacturers or consumers than negligence
rules. 24
Meanwhile, legal scholars who sought to apply the insights
of moral philosophy to tort law were increasingly drawn to theories
of corrective justice.25 From the perspective of corrective justice
theorists, enterprise liability models appeared to be founded on
some dubious moral assumptions, such as the severing of tort li-
ability from a finding of intentional or negligent conduct. In the
view of those scholars, enterprise liability schemes could be seen as
requiring persons who had not intentionally or carelessly contrib-
uted to injuries, such as consumers of a strictly liable defendant's
products or drivers of cars in a state with compulsory automobile
insurance and a no-fault automobile accident plan, to contribute to
the compensation of injured persons.
26
Neither of those new scholarly offshoots of the legal academy
should be regarded as inevitably hostile to the growth of enterprise
23. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Positite Economic Thcory of Tort
Law, 15 GA_ L REV. 851 (1981); Posner, A Theory of Negligence, supra note 16.
24. See, e.g., Posner, A Comment on No.Fault Insurance for All Accidents, supra note 16;
Richard A. Posner, The Cost of Accidents-A Legal and Economic Analysis, 37 U. CHI. L. REV.
636 (1970); Posner, Strict Liability, supra note 16.
25. See, e.g., Jules Coleman, Moral Theories of Torts: Their Scope and Limits, 1 LAW &
PHIL. 371 (1982); Ernest Weinrib, Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law, 2 LAW & PHIL 37
(1983).
26. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 17, at 568.
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liability models in tort law. The legal academics who increasingly
turned away from doctrinal synthesis and reorganization after 1980
could have employed economic and moral theory to support the dis-
tributive assumptions of enterprise liability. They could have cho-
sen to ground proposals for no-fault alternatives to the tort system
or for strict liability for defective products on economic and moral
theories, citing, for instance, the ease by which an insured enter-
prise could spread or shift its costs or the powerlessness of consum-
ers to appraise the risks of defective products.27
Instead these scholars chose to critique such theories. So the
decades after 1980 have not just witnessed the increased influence
of economic and moral theory in torts scholarship, they have wit-
nessed the dominance of particular versions of economic and moral
theory. Those versions, I have previously suggested, tend to com-
plement negligence models of tort liability rather than enterprise
liability models. But before pursing that suggestion in more detail,
I turn to the unexpected persistence of negligence-based liability in
another arena: the courts.
B. Doctrinal Trends
Even a cursory survey of developments in tort doctrine be-
tween 1980 and 2000 will reveal the perpetuation of the negligence
model as the dominant mechanism for determining liability in torts
cases. Some commentators, noticing this trend, have evaluated it in
light of the expansion in enterprise liability that was anticipated in
the 1970s, and characterized it as a "liability-limiting" tendency. 28
In some areas, particularly products liability, the characterization
appears to be apt: courts have retreated from previous doctrinal
positions that would have widened the ambit of an enterprise's ac-
countability. 29 But in other areas of tort law, decisions reveal that
the negligence principle has been used to expand liability. The
characterization of those decisions as expansionist relies on a dif-
27. These justifications for strict liability had been advanced by both Prosser and Traynor
as early as the first half of the 1940s. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440.44
(Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 689-93 (1941).
28. See, e.g., Stephen D. Sugarman, Judges as Tort Law Un-Makers: Recent California Ex-
perience with "New" Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 455 (1999) (describing the apparent retrenchment
of strict liability in the California courts over the last fifteen years).
29. See, e.g., Soule v. General Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298 (Cal. 1994); Anderson v. Owens.
Corning Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549 (Cal. 1991); Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal.
1988); Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239 (N.J. 1990); Feldman v. Lederle Labs.,
479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984).
1346 [Vol. 54:3:1337
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ferent baseline for comparison. The baseline is not enterprise li-
ability but established subsidiary doctrines in traditional negli-
gence cases, doctrines that had the effect of allowing defendants
who engaged in an unacceptably risky level of conduct (defendants
who were "negligent in the air") to escape liability altogether. The
decisions can be seen as refining those subsidiary doctrines of tradi-
tional negligence theory to tie the actual exposure of tort defen-
dants more closely to their unacceptably risky conduct.
The two lines of decisions, using negligence standards to
both contract and expand liability, caution against any inference
that tort law's general thrust in the last two decades has been to
reduce the role of the torts system as a device for compensating in-
jured persons. Instead, the two lines of decisions suggest a closer
equation of tort liability with determinations of fault, whether on
the part of defendants or plaintiffs. Only some of the decisions ex-
hibit a preference for more restrictive negligence-based standards
as opposed to expansionist enterprise liability alternatives, and
those "liability-limiting" decisions could be said to be less vivid ex-
amples of tort doctrine staking out new paths. Several other deci-
sions, however, are not so much concerned with liability expansion
or contraction but with what might be called liability tailoring: de-
veloping more refined connections between a determination that a
party in a torts case engaged in unacceptably risky conduct-was
negligent-and that party's exposure to tort liability. Taken to-
gether, the latter set of decisions demonstrates the encroachment of
negligence principles not only into the realm of enterprise liability,
but into a preexisting realm of no liability.
1. The Persistence of Negligence: Liability-Limiting Examples
The most conspicuous example of the persistence of negli-
gence theory in the face of enterprise liability alternatives has been
a line of California defective products cases in which a strict stan-
dard of liability, originally conceived as an enterprise liability-
based alternative to negligence,30 became riddled with doctrinal
concepts borrowed from negligence and increasingly limited in its
scope. 31 California's tendency to limit the scope of strict liability in
30. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., Inc., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978); Greenman v. Yuba
Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963); Escolo, 150 P.2d at 440.44 (Traynor, J., concurring).
31. See, e.g., Peterson v. Superior Court, 889 P.2d 905 (Cal. 1995); Soule, 882 P.2d at 298;
Anderson, 810 P.2d at 549; Brown, 751 P.2d at 470.
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defective products was followed in other jurisdictions,3 2 so much so
that a section of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, originally
drafted in 1965, which anticipated the widespread use of enterprise
liability throughout the area of defective products law, has been
replaced by a draft section in the Restatement (Third) of Torts
which confines enterprise liability in defective products to manufac-
turing defect cases.3 3 The change in the Restatements recognizes
that late twentieth-century courts have been employing, in cases
raising design defect issues, criteria for determining "defectiveness"
that were virtually identical to the criteria for determining "rea-
sonable conduct" in negligence cases. 3
4
Another line of cases that has been read as demonstrating a
connection between negligence theory and the development of limi-
tations on liability involves suits for recovery based on emotional
distress. A study of the California courts in the years between 1987
and 1999 noted that the judicial criteria employed for determining
eligibility for emotional distress recovery has evolved from multiple
factors offered for the consideration of juries to limiting rules. In-
stead of the factors being guidelines for juries to assess the genu-
ineness of an emotional distress claim, they have become, increas-
ingly, ways for courts to limit the scope of emotional distress recov-
ery.35
Those cases may show that negligence criteria can limit as
well as extend tort liability-negligence criteria were employed to
launch emotional distress recovery where emotional injury had pre-
viously not been compensable 36-but they do not illustrate the re-
jection of enterprise liability alternatives. The relevant doctrinal
baseline in emotional distress cases has never been between strict
liability and negligence-emotional distress recovery has always
been predicated on a showing of intentional or negligent conduct-
but between negligence-based liability and no liability at all.
Two features have distinguished emotional distress cases.
One is the fact that the defendant's risk-creating conduct was such
that it could have produced, or did produce, physical harm to one
32. See, e.g., Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 955 (Md. 1976); Uloth v. City Tank
Corp., 384 N.E.2d 1188 (Mass. 1978); Prentis v. Yale Mfg., 365 N.W.2d 176 (Mich. 1984); Voss v.
Black & Decker Mfg. Co,. 450 N.E.2d 204 (N.Y. 1983); Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584
S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979).
33. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 1-2 (1998).
34. See, e.g., Soule, 882 P.2d at 298; Camacho v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 741 P.2d 1240
(Colo. 1987).
35. Sugarman, supra note 28, at 482.
36. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
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party, even though the gravamen of the suit is emotional harm to
that party or to a third party. Courts have been very reluctant to
allow recovery for emotional distress when the defendant's conduct
did not expose anyone to physical risks. 37 Thus emotional distress
cases can be said to be a subset of physical injury negligence cases,
where, fortuitously, risks of physical injury eventuated in emotional
harm. In this sense the negligence analysis-the determination of
reasonable conduct on the part of the defendant-is no different in
emotional injury cases from physical injury cases.
38
The other notable feature of emotional distress cases has
been an emphasis on criteria limiting liability. Those criteria have
followed from the general concern, in such cases, that once a defen-
dant's conduct falls below an appropriate level of reasonableness,
that defendant might be liable for fortuitous and idiosyncratic emo-
tional injury. Courts have used the rubric of proximate causation to
limit liability for some fortuitous injuries in physical harm cases,
but have not limited liability for idiosyncratic physical harm (the
so-called "thin skull" cases). 39 In the emotional harm area, however,
there has been concern about how to distinguish idiosyncratic harm
from harm that is feigned. The multiple factors used to determine
eligibility for emotional distress recovery have been efforts to iden-
tify "genuine" harm. But the tightening of those factors still permits
negligence-based recovery where no recovery had been the previous
baseline. Thus liability-restricting developments in emotional dis-
tress cases should not be seen as having any implications for the
choice between negligence and enterprise-based models of liability,
only as tying recovery more closely to established criteria developed
under a negligence model.
37. The two major exceptions to this generalization are recovery for negligently incorrect
reporting of the death of a close relative and recovery for the negligent mishandling of dead bod-
ies. See, e.g., Gammon v. Osteopathic Hosp. of Me., Inc., 534 A.2d 1282 (Me. 1987); Johnson v.
State, 334 N.E.2d 590 (N.Y. 1975). These exceptions illustrate that the principal concern in
emotional distress recovery is distinguishing genuine from idiosyncratic or feigned claims. Often
the genuineness of a claim can be derived by focusing on the fact that the defendant's conduct
was sufficiently risky to cause physical as well as emotional harm. The exceptions are cases
where even though risks of physical injury would not be created by the defendant's conduct,
genuine anguish on the part of most relatives of the third party in question could be reasonably
anticipated.
38. I am indebted to Kenneth Abraham for this description of emotional distress cases.
39. See, e.g., Bartolone v. Jeckovich, 103 A.D.2d 632 (N.Y. 1984); McCahill v. New York
Transp. Co., 94 N.E. 616 (N.Y. 1911).
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2. The Persistence of Negligence: Liability-Tailoring Examples
A similar effort to tie eligibility for recovery in tort more
closely to findings of unacceptably risky conduct can be seen in sev-
eral lines of cases modifying traditional subsidiary doctrines in
negligence law. Cumulatively, the modifications tie the account-
ability of both plaintiffs and defendants in negligence cases more
closely to findings that they were at fault. Sometimes modifications
have had the effect of reducing the recovery of particular plaintiffs,
or the liability of particular defendants, especially in cases involv-
ing multiple parties, but on the whole they have served to establish
closer connections between a party's negligence and that party's
responsibility to contribute to the costs of an injury.
One example has been the refinement of comparative negli-
gence principles, well established in many jurisdictions by the
1970s, to deal with complexities raised by multiple party cases. In
some jurisdictions, comparative negligence has been applied in a
"pure" form, resulting in some recovery for parties whose contribu-
tion to their injuries was deemed greater than 50%.40 Other juris-
dictions have provided for the reallocation of liability among multi-
ple parties where one negligent party, whose comparative contribu-
tion had been assessed, was unaccountable for any injuries because
of insolvency.41 The principal effect of these cases has been to tie
the accountability of parties in negligence cases more closely to jury
findings of that party's "equitable share," determined by the party's
comparative level of fault. Under a contributory negligence regime,
or one not providing for reallocation of equitable share liability in
comparative negligence suits involving multiple parties, negligent
defendants might be deemed to have no accountability to contribu-
tory negligent plaintiffs, or the contributory negligence of plaintiffs
might be ignored by juries or obviated by doctrines such as last
clear chance. In addition, the presence of a negligent but insolvent
party in a multiple parties case might result in accountability, or
recovery, out of proportion to a plaintiff of defendant's fault. Thus
these developments can be seen as efforts to replace pockets of "no
liability" within a negligence-based regime with more tailored con-
nections between unacceptably risky conduct and liability.
40. See, e.g., Sutton v. Piasecki Trucking, Inc., 451 N.E.2d 481 (N.Y. 1983) (allowing a
driver found to be 99% at fault to recover one percent of his damages).
41. See UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAuLT AcT § 2(d), 12 U.L.A. 136 (1996).
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Another example is the surfacing of doctrines based on prob-
abilistic causation in negligence cases. Traditionally, a party found
to have engaged in unacceptably risky conduct would escape liabil-
ity for that conduct if no injured person could show a greater than
50% chance that the conduct had caused his or her injuries. Under
the so-called "but for" requirement of proof in a negligence action,
an injured plaintiff needed to establish that it was more probable
than not that "but for" a defendant's negligent conduct, the plaintiff
would not have been injured. In several recent cases, however,
plaintiffs have been able to recover some damages from negligent
defendants without a showing that it was more probable than not
that the defendants caused those damages. Examples include a
plaintiffs recovery for damages calculated on the basis of a negli-
gently created, but less than 50%, "lost opportunity" to survive un-
preventable complications from an operation, 42 and a negligently
created, but less than 50% "enhanced risk" of specific future in-
jury.43 In an analogous line of cases, plaintiffs have been able to
recover damages for injuries they suffered from an unacceptably
risky product's placement on the market, even though they were
only able to establish the market share of a particular defendant in
the industry manufacturing that product, not prove that there was
a greater than 50% probability that that defendant actually sup-
plied them with the product.44 Although these developments all re-
sult in the extension of liability where it would previously not have
existed, their principal thrust is to tie accountability in the tort sys-
tem more directly to negligence, since without a modification of the
"but for" requirement in those cases negligent defendants would
remain unaccountable.
Yet another example comes from a line of third-party negli-
gence cases characterized by Robert Rabin as "enabling torts."
45
Those cases have permitted recovery against a third-party defen-
dant where that defendant's conduct has the effect of unacceptably
increasing the risks others might impose on members of the public.
Examples are cases where defendants leave cars unlocked with
keys in the ignition, increasing the risk of car thieves endangering
others after stealing the cars;46 cases where defendants negligently
42. See, e.g., Falcon v. Mem'l Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44, 56 (Mich. 1990).
43. See, e.g., Petriello v. Kalman, 576 A.2d 474,484 (Conn. 1990).
44. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924. 937-38 (Cal. 1980); Hymnowitz v. Eli Lilly
& Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1078 (N.Y. 1989).
45. Robert Rabin, Enabling Torts, 49 DEPAUL L REV. 435, 435-38 (1999).
46. See, e.g., Palma v. U.S. Indus. Fasteners Inc., 681 P.2d 893, 902-03 (Cal. 1984); Cruz v.
Middhekauf Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 909 P.2d 1252, 1255-57 (Utah 1996).
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entrust potentially dangerous instrumentalities to identifiably
risky persons;47 cases where manufacturers of dangerous products
such as handguns take inadequate precautions to prevent those
products from reaching unauthorized persons; 48 and cases where
manufacturers of products containing safeguards which render the
products less hazardous, but less convenient to operate, make it
possible for their customers to bypass the safeguards, thereby en-
hancing the risks of injury to users of the products. 49 All those cases
represent modifications of the common law principle that there is
no affirmative "duty" to protect third parties against the conduct of
risky others: their rationale is that the third party defendant is ac-
countable because it affirmatively "enabled" that risky conduct.
Were the liability of such "enablers" to be cut off by invocation of
the traditional doctrine that citizens own no affirmative duties to
protect the general public from risks created by others, there would
be a less precise connection between unacceptable risk-enhancing
conduct (negligence) and accountability for injuries related to that
conduct.
Recent successful class action suits against industries that
create public health risks, most conspicuously the tobacco industry,
combine elements of the above lines of cases. Critical to the success
of suits against tobacco manufacturers has been the emergence of
new classes of plaintiffs, so-called "secondhand" victims of the risks
associated with smoking. One class has been composed of nonsmok-
ers whose occupations place them in close contact with cigarette
smoke, such as airline flight attendants.5 0 Another class has been
state governments required to pay the enhanced medical costs asso-
ciated with the serious damage to their citizens' health by smok-
ing.51
These classes of plaintiffs are proceeding on a theory of li-
ability resembling that in the "enabling" negligence cases: they are
claiming that cigarette manufacturers negligently enhanced the
risky conduct of smokers by not adequately warning them of the
risks posed to themselves and to others by regular exposure to ciga-
rette smoke. They have an important advantage in their suits over
smoker plaintiffs. Smoker plaintiffs, even having surmounted the
47. See, e.g., Vince v. Wilson, 561 A.2d 103, 104 (Vt. 1989).
48. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 827-33 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); Merrill v.
Navegar, Inc., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146, 170-73 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
49. See, e.g., Lopez v. Precision Papers, Inc., 492 N.E.2d 1214, 1215 (N.Y. 1986).
50. See, e.g., Broin v. Philip Morris Co., 641 So. 2d 888 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
51. See Rabin, supra note 45, at 448.
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obstacle of establishing causal connections between smoking and
health risks, are confronted with the fact that they continued to
smoke after becoming aware of those risks. Nonsmoking "second-
hand" victims of exposure to cigarette smoke, once a connection be-
tween that exposure and enhanced health risks is established, face
no comparable contributory fault obstacles. Nor, of course, do gov-
ernmental entities seek to recover heath costs.
But all plaintiffs in suits against the tobacco industry face
the potential difficulty of not being able to identify the particular
defendant who increased their health risks or medical costs. These
plaintiffs now have available to them the theory of market share
liability. The success of "secondhand victim" suits against the to-
bacco industry may result in a revival of suits by individual smoker
plaintiffs, and it is possible that both comparative negligence and
market share liability principles will come to govern those suits. If
smoker plaintiffs could establish a concerted effort by tobacco
manufacturers to conceal the riskiness of their product, then their
having continued to smoke after learning of the risks, or their in-
ability to identify the precise defendant who concealed the risks
from them, would not bar recovery, although it would reduce it.
One feature of mass tort litigation against industries creat-
ing public health risks52 may point away from seeing this develop-
ment as consistent with the expansion of negligence-based liability.
If, as in the asbestos, contraceptive, and implant examples, the
goodwill costs of being a visible defendant in a mass torts case with
significant public health overtones lead those defendants to settle
even where they might defeat or significantly reduce their liability
through negligence doctrines, one might say that in those instances
mass tort lawsuits are being used to establish the equivalent of en-
terprise liability. The history of mass torts suits against the manu-
facturers of Dalkon Shield contraceptives, asbestos products, and
silicone implants reveals a pattern now surfacing in the tobacco
cases: manufacturers initially used negligence law to defend them-
selves, but agreed to large-scale compensation packages when the
public health risks of their products became notorious. One could
also argue, however, using the cigarette industry example, that
such enterprises only agree to compensation settlements when law-
suits establish strong enough evidence of their negligence in con-
cealing the riskiness of their products that they fear massive jury
52. In addition to the tobacco industry, such industries include manufacturers of handguns,
widely used toxic products such as asbestos, and widely used dangerous health care products,
such as contraceptives or implants.
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verdicts. If so, their accountability is in fact tied to their unaccepta-
bly risky conduct.
Except for the last example, all of the above developments,
whether liability-contracting, liability-expanding, or liability-tailor-
ing, demonstrate the robustness of the negligence model in the late
twentieth century. But pockets of enterprise liability remain, not
only in the areas of abnormally dangerous activities and defective
products, but also in a principle cutting across a variety of tort ac-
tions, that of the vicarious liability of employers for the negligence
of their employees. This principle, which allows suits against not
only private enterprises but also school boards, state colleges and
universities, and municipalities for injuries they had no direct role
in causing, carves out a relatively large space for enterprise-based
liability in the contemporary torts system. It often makes an em-
ployer defendant accountable simply because that defendant em-
ployed a person whose negligence caused harm to another. One
could argue, in addition, that a principal justification for vicarious
liability has been the superior capacity of employers, as compared
to their employees, to spread and shift the costs of injuries caused
by the employees' risky conduct.5 3
Gary Schwartz, however, has argued that vicarious liability
rests primarily on deterrence principles: it creates incentives on the
part of employers to take safety measures in the selection, training,
supervision, and performance assessment of their employees. He
suggests that such measures often occur in time frames so remote
from the actual risk-creating conduct of employees that they are
difficult to recover by plaintiffs or courts, necessitating a prophylac-
tic "enterprise liability" rule if employers are to be given incentives
to make their employees' conduct safe.54 Following this line of ar-
gument, one could see the "scope of employment" limitation on vi-
carious liability, which all jurisdictions recognize, as representing a
tacit understanding that employer deterrence is only effective when
the employer is actually in a position to protect against the risk-
creating conduct of its employees. Thus the vicarious liability doc-
trine, although not technically consistent with negligence-based
liability, is consistent with one of the principal goals of a negligence
system: to provide incentives for people to make realistic tradeoffs
53. Patrick Atiyah, Vicarious Liability, in RIGHTING THE LIABILITY BALANcE: REPORT OF
THE CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON TORT REFORM (1977).
54. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Hidden and Fundamental Issue of Vicarious Liability, 69 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1739, 1759-64 (1996).
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between preventing and paying for the costs of their unacceptably
risky conduct.
C. Parallels Between Academic Theories and Doctrinal Trends
Every one of the developments related to the persistence of
negligence theory, whether its effect has been to contract or to ex-
pand liability, can be seen as consistent with both efficiency-based
economic perspectives on tort law and with corrective justice per-
spectives. Few explicit citations to the literature of economic theory
or moral philosophy can be found in opinions, but one would not
expect that literature to be treated as the equivalent of legal
authority. Specific correlations between theoretical torts scholar-
ship and judicial opinions are thus more difficult to draw than they
were in the 1950s or 1960s. Nonetheless, the parallels between
dominant academic perspectives and trends in tort law from 1980 to
2000 are highly suggestive.
Consider each of the doctrinal developments surveyed above.
The reduced role of strict, enterprise-based liability in products li-
ability appears consistent with efficiency arguments emphasizing
deterrence. First, those arguments suggest that a strict liability
standard creates no more incentives for enterprises to make prod-
ucts safer than does a negligence standard, especially given the
goodwill costs to enterprises of having their products labeled "defec-
tive."55 Second, the arguments suggest that a strict liability stan-
dard might encourage enterprises to build the projected costs of
products liability lawsuits into the market prices of their products,
rather than conveying more information to consumers about the
products' risks.
The dominance of negligence theory in products liability
cases also appears consistent with corrective justice arguments,
especially if comparative negligence principles are applied. There
are two reasons for this. First, comparative negligence results in a
negligent plaintiff who was injured by a defective product being
neither barred from suit, nor recovering in full, but securing a re-
covery consistent with his or her contribution to the injury. Second,
if jurors are asked to compare the contribution of a defendant
whose liability is based on strict liability doctrines with the contri-
bution of a negligent plaintiff, they may have difficulty conceptual-
izing the comparison in terms of comparative "fault." The original




versions of enterprise liability in defective products anticipated that
contributory negligence defenses would not be available to defen-
dants in products liability suits, because invoking those defenses
would defeat the distributive goals sought in a strict liability re-
gime.56 Even when jurisdictions began to adopt comparative negli-
gence, some judges balked at giving defendants found to have
placed defective products on the market an opportunity to assess
plaintiffs' a portion of their damages when they had contributed to
their injuries.57 Recently the trend has been to treat enterprise li-
ability as a species of fault for comparative purposes, and to com-
pare all the fault of plaintiffs against that of defendants.5 8 Correc-
tive justice arguments would support this trend, suggesting that a
plaintiffs recovery should be reduced to the extent, and only to the
extent, that his fault contributed to his injury.
In general, the development of comparative fault in cases in-
volving suits that combine claims based on enterprise liability and
negligence appears consistent with both efficiency and corrective
justice theories, especially when coupled with the increased use of a
procedure for the reallocation of "equitable share" responsibility
among multiple parties. Under an equitable shares procedure that
provides for reallocation of an insolvent party's share, all parties
engaged in risk creating conduct, either to others or to themselves,
will have their equitable shares affected by the extent to which they
could have reasonably prevented the risks. According to the norma-
tive assumptions of efficiency literature, they will thus be deterred
from engaging in risky conduct up to the point where their mar-
ginal costs of preventing or avoiding risks remain lower than the
benefits they receive from that conduct.
The refinement of comparative principles of liability can also
be seen as an attempt to calibrate the risky conduct of a party to his
responsibility to contribute to the costs of an injury related to that
conduct. The practice of reallocating the "equitable share" of insol-
vent defendants in multiple party cases implements the policy that
no party, whether negligent or accountable on enterprise liability
principles, should receive a windfall or suffer a loss disproportion-
ate to his or her comparative responsibility for contributing to the
risky conduct that produced injury. In other words, reallocation
means that parties whose risky conduct has been compared in the
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 484 (1965).
57. See, e.g., Daly v. Gen. Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162 (Cal. 1978) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
58. See, e.g., Whitehead v. Toyota Motor Corp., 897 S.W.2d 684 (Tenn. 1995).
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assignment of their equitable responsibility will be made to pay ac-
cording to their comparative deserts. In this regime, rather than an
alternative to fault-based accountability, enterprise liability be-
comes simply another species of fault.
The emergence of probabilistic doctrines of factual causation,
including market share liability, is consistent with efficiency theo-
ries emphasizing deterrence. Under those doctrines, defendants en-
gaged in unacceptably risky conduct will not always be able to es-
cape liability just by showing that the plaintiffs injured by that
conduct cannot establish it was more probable than not that it was
the defendants' risky conduct that caused their injuries (sometimes
because plaintiffs were unable to identify the particular defendant
whose risky product they used). Their additional exposure in these
situations would seem to give such defendants additional incentives
to raise the safety levels of their conduct.
The emergence of probabilistic-based doctrines is also consis-
tent with corrective justice. One of the most prominent features of
those doctrines-recovery for a less than 50% enhanced risk of in-
jury, recovery for a less than 50% lost opportunity to survive, or
recovery against a defendant, based on that defendant's share in a
market of risky products, where a plaintiff could not establish that
it was more probable than not that the defendant's product had ac-
tually caused the plaintiffs injuries-is the precise tailoring of
plaintiffs' recoveries to the percentage of the damages that can be
attributed to the defendant through either lost opportunity, en-
hanced risk, or market share. Without such doctrines, plaintiffs
would recover nothing, even though they had established that de-
fendants had engaged in unacceptably risky conduct that either
caused them injury or increased their risks of being injured.
Similarly, the development of liability for persons whose
negligence makes it more likely that others will injure third parties
is consistent with efficiency theories, because the prospective li-
ability of such "enablers" could be expected to provide additional
disincentives for persons to explicitly or implicitly encourage risky
conduct in others. The extension of negligence-based "enabling" li-
ability would also appear to be consistent with corrective justice
theories, because judicial recognition of enablers as tort defendants
results in injured plaintiffs being able to proceed against two poten-
tial parties in a suit where "enabling" conduct has arguably con-
tributed to their injuries. If comparative fault principles are ap-
plied, the availability of an additional defendant could be expected




Mass tort claims against enterprises associated with public
health risks, another developing feature of the torts landscape in
the late twentieth century, have previously been characterized as
making use of doctrinal modifications in the "enabling torts" and
probabilistic causation cases. One would thus expect findings of
manufacturer liability in mass public health cases to be consistent
with both deterrence and corrective justice theories, in the same
fashion that extensions of liability in enabling torts cases and prob-
abilistic causation cases are consistent with both theories. The in-
creased exposure of manufacturers of products with public health
effects should, under efficiency theory, create additional incentives
for them to make those products safer or to better inform the public
of their risks. In a similar manner, the increased exposure of to-
bacco companies to claims from "secondhand" plaintiffs would seem
consistent with corrective justice principles. Indeed the use of
somewhat modified traditional negligence principles in mass tort
public health cases can be seen as providing an alternative to the
disposition of such claims against enterprises allegedly producing
public health risks by a social insurance scheme emphasizing en-
terprise liability.
Even vicarious liability, reformulated as a prophylactic rule
placing a burden on employers to ensure that their employees do
not impose unreasonable risks on others, can be seen as promoting
both efficiency, by creating incentives for employers to insist that
their employees maintain a reasonable level of safety, and correc-
tive justice, by providing injured persons with another potential
source of compensation for their injuries, one similar to that pro-
vided through enabling torts.
Thus there are striking parallels between, on the one hand,
the dominance of economic theories emphasizing deterrence ver-
sions of efficiency and moral theories emphasizing corrective justice
in the late twentieth-century legal academy, and, on the other
hand, the persistence of negligence-based models of tort liability in
the courts of the same time. I now turn to ask whether those paral-
lel developments are more than coincidental, and, if so, what fac-
tors might have produced such unanticipated shifts in academic
theory and legal doctrine. In Tort Law in America, I sought to ex-
plain changes in the theoretical and doctrinal fabric of nineteenth-
and twentieth-century tort law by looking at the legal academy's,
and the larger culture's, changing conceptions of law and its role as
a mechanism for responding to the plight of injured persons in
American society. The question is whether that approach can help
make sense of the recent developments surveyed above.
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D. Internal Explanations for the Parallel Developments
One explanation for why efficiency-based and corrective-
justice based theories of tort law emerged after 1980 might empha-
size the persistence of scholarly impulses I had characterized in
Tort Law in America as "neoconceptualist." That term denoted a
renewed attention on the part of torts scholars to comprehensive
theories of tort liability, based on concepts drawn from other disci-
plines rather than from the essentialist principles of "law as a sci-
ence" that served as the starting presuppositions of "conceptualist"
tort theory in the late nineteenth century. 9 My discussion there of
neoconceptualist torts scholarship focused on two efficiency-based
theories, that advanced by Guido Calabresi and that promulgated
by Richard Posner, and two corrective justice-based theories, those
of George Fletcher and Richard Epstein.60
In retrospect, the "neoconceptualist" impulses I identified in
some torts scholarship in the 1970s were precursors of larger schol-
arly trends within the legal academy that became dominant by the
end of the century. Those trends aimed to replace the models of le-
gal scholarship dominant from the 1930s through the early 1970s,
which emphasized doctrinal analysis and synthesis, and proposals
for doctrinal innovation in specific areas of law, with models em-
phasizing far more abstract and general theories of the subject of
law itself, typically based on the metatheoretical assumptions of
other disciplines. From this perspective, the application of effi-
ciency-based theories to torts cases could be seen as an instance of
the application of economic theory to law as a whole. Likewise, the
application of corrective justice theories to torts cases could be
taken to be part of a general reconceptualization of law around first
principles of moral philosophy.
Numerous scholars have documented late tventieth-century
legal scholars' increased interest in "grand theories" of law derived
from other disciplines, and a corresponding decline of their interest
in the doctrinal work that characterized of previous generations.61
But there was an additional development in torts scholarship, as
torts scholars increasingly adopted efficiency-based and corrective-
justice based theories. Although perhaps these new theories were
59. WHITE, supra note 1, at 37-56, 211-15.
60. Id. at 219-29.
61. See generally LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISIM (1996);
Symposium, Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 955 (1981).
2001] 1359
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
initially competitors, pitting "efficiency" against "justice,"6 2 effi-
ciency-based and corrective justice-based theories began to con-
verge, in one important respect, as they developed. In torts, each
theory abandoned one strand of the discipline from which it
emerged.
Legal theorists interested in applying the insights of eco-
nomics to tort law emphasized the starting assumptions of the wel-
fare economics strand, as it had developed in the years after World
War II, which promoted the maximization of individual utility and
market-based solutions to social policy issues. 63 They rejected the
distributive strand of economic theory, which had been the main-
stream thrust of the discipline of economics in the 1930s and 19408
and had been endorsed by some of the legal scholars attracted to
enterprise liability in the years from 1930 to 1970.64
Similarly, theorists interested in applying the insights of
moral philosophy to tort cases increasingly rejected the strand of
moral philosophy concerned with distributive justice. Their interest
turned instead to developing correlations between moral desert, or
moral obligation, and compensation or liability in the tort system.6 5
They were not interested in using the tort system as a means of
making all members of society responsible for alleviating the condi-
tion of the disadvantaged. 66 Thus both perspectives increasingly
rejected a role for tort law as a mechanism for compensating in-
jured persons by distributing risks and obligations throughout soci-
ety. That was precisely the role that some members of a previous
generation of scholars, also employing arguments based on eco-
nomic and moral theories, had associated with doctrines and poli-
cies predicated on enterprise liability.
So the general trend toward grand theory in the legal acad-
emy, or even the predominance of theories derived from economics
and moral philosophy, would not seem to explain why particular
versions of economics and moral philosophy came to be dominant
among legal scholars while other theories garnered far less atten-
tion. Nor, in a time period in which torts scholars paid less atten-
tion to the actual decisions of judges in torts cases and produced
62. See CALABRESI, supra note 15, at 291-92.
63. See, e.g., NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 301 (1995); James
Hackney, Jr., Law and Neoclassical Economics: Science, Politics, and the Reconfiguration of
American Tort Law Theory, 15 LAW & HIST. REV. 275 (1997).
64. See Nolan & Ursin, supra note 14, at 68-72, 75-77.
65. See ERNEST WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 122-26 (1995).
66. Id. at 36-38; see also Fletcher, supra note 17, at 568.
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less scholarship of direct relevance to those judges in their deci-
sionmaking, has there been the kind of academic-judicial symbiosis
that one can find in the scholarly writings of Prosser and the torts
opinions of Traynor. Indeed, despite the parallels I have noted be-
tween efficiency- and corrective justice-based theories in the acad-
emy and negligence-centered decisions in the courts, one rarely
finds judges citing efficiency or corrective justice theorists.
If anything, torts scholars' preoccupation with increasingly
abstract, comprehensive theory after 1980 might incline one to con-
clude that their theories have been less influential in the courts in
the past two decades. Certainly, trends in academic scholarship
partly explain the decrease in explicit judicial reliance on academic
literature in that period. One could hardly expect judges to cite
scholars who are preoccupied with disciplines other than law and
who pay comparatively little attention to doctrinal analysis or syn-
thesis. But to conclude that, at least in tort law, academic theory
grew away from judicial doctrine in the last two decades would be
misleading. There is abundant evidence that between 1980 and
2000, dominant trends in tort theory and dominant trends in tort
doctrine generally reinforced one another. Thus one must look be-
yond both the academy and the courts to see why those parallel de-
velopments occurred.
E. External Explanations for the Parallel Developments
Let us return briefly to the period between 1930 and 1970,
whose cumulative developments would likely have induced a 1970s
scholar to foresee the continued growth of enterprise liability mod-
els as alternatives to the traditional negligence-based model of tort
liability. Consider the starting assumptions that united advocates
of such enterprise-liability models, assumptions we can group into
two related categories. The first category would contain assump-
tions about the torts system: that it embodied the same sorts of in-
efficiencies and inequities that were embedded in the increasingly
problematic system of free market capitalism. The second category
would include assumptions about governmental units as distribu-
tors of the risks associated with activity in a modern industrial so-
ciety and of the costs of injuries related to that activity: that gov-
ernmental units were superior (fairer and more efficient) distribu-
tors. In short, enthusiasts for enterprise-based liability systems
began from distributive premises, identified a negligence-based tort
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system with market failure, and believed that alternative systems
should reflect the superior distributive capacities of government.
6 7
Thus workmen's compensation proposals from this period as-
sumed that legislative imposition of enforced contributions to a
compensation fund by employers (and, indirectly, by employees,
who forfeit a certain percentage of tort claims and whose benefits
are treated as part of their job income),68 coupled with administra-
tive determinations of the scope of eligibility for coverage in indi-
vidual cases, would be superior to the existing torts system, which
was characterized as reflecting inequities in the safety levels of in-
dustrial jobs that were related to inequities in the market power of
employers and employees. 6 9
Similarly, no-fault accident plans initially developed in the
1960s have assumed that a legislatively imposed, administratively
enforced compensation fund system is superior to the existing tort
system because the existing system, with its fortuitous jury ver-
dicts, its opportunities for defendants to delay compensation as long
as possible, and its reliance on lawyers operating under contingent
fee arrangements, amounts to a "failed market" in distributing the
risks and the costs of injury-creating conduct, and because the gov-
ernmental units implementing no-fault will be more efficient and
fairer distributors of those risks and costs. 0
Finally, advocates of enterprise-based liability in the defec-
tive products area assumed that strict liability rules imposed by the
courts, rather than negligence rules derived from standards of rea-
sonable safety in the manufacture, design, or use of products placed
on the market, would do a better job of distributing the risks, and
the costs, of injury from defective products throughout the popula-
tion. In the absence of such strict rules, they assumed, optimal lev-
els of distributing the risks and costs would not be reached, because
defendants in defective products cases would seek, through the in-
vocation of traditional tort defenses, to place the costs of injuries on
67. See generally, EHRENZWEIG, supra note 11; Fleming James, Jr., Products Liability (Part
I), 34 TEX. L. REV. 44 (1955); Fleming James, Jr., Products Liability (Part II), 34 TEX. L. REV.
192 (1955).
68. See Lawrence Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial Ac-
cidents, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 50, 70-72 (1967); see generally NOLAN & URSIN supra note 22, at 21-
26.
69. See, e.g., Fleming James, Jr., Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability
Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549 (1948); Leon Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28
COLUM. L. REV. 1014 (1928); Leon Green, The Individual's Protection Under Negligence Law:
Risk Sharing, 47 Nw. U. L. REV. 751 (1953).
70. See JEFFREY O'CONNELL, THE LAWSUIT LOTERY: ONLY THE LAWYERS WIN 160 (1979).
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consumers, rather than making greater efforts to increase the
safety of their products, or, alternatively, insuring themselves
against accidents and distributing the cost of that insurance among
their consumers in the form of higher prices.
71
Now consider the current stature of those pro-government,
anti-market assumptions among academic theorists and in Ameri-
can society in general. Both categories of assumptions have been
called into question. In academic literature, for example, "public
choice" studies of the legislative process have challenged the as-
sumption that legislatures are equitable or efficient distributors of
the risks and costs of injury-creating activity. These studies empha-
size the significant incentives on the part of legislators to preserve
their own incumbency, and in the process to welcome support from
established interest groups and lobbyists whose market power in-
creases their access to legislators and whose goals are to further
their own political and economic agendas rather than to promote a
fairer or more efficient distribution of the costs of injuries.
72
Another set of studies has emphasized the unanticipated
costs of administrative distribution of the risks and costs of inju-
ries, citing delays produced by the bureaucratic levels of adminis-
trative government and the tendency of administrative procedures
for determining eligibility for compensation to harden, over time,
into arbitrary rules with little capacity to promote distributive effi-
ciency and justice.
73
Yet another set of studies has suggested that judge-made en-
terprise liability rules in the defective products areas may not have
had the effects judicial policymakers anticipated, producing neither
distributive efficiency nor distributive justice. In some areas of de-
fective products law, users of a product, not manufacturers, insur-
ers, or prospective consumers, may be the best position to assess
the comparative costs and benefits of making that product safer but
less convenient. More generally, strict liability rules, imposed in
lieu of traditional negligence rules, may not in themselves create
greater incentives for safety, since even when an enterprise can
show that it could not reasonably have avoided a defect in its prod-
71. See EHRENZWEIG, supra note 11, at 1440-41.
72. See Richard Abel, Questioning the Counter-Majoritarian Thesis: The Case of Torts, 49
DEPAUL L. REV. 533, 535-37 (1999).
73. See ALEXANDER V. MATEJKO, THE SELF-DEFEATING ORGANIZATION: A CRITIQUE OF
BUREAUCRACY 265-70 (1986); Oliver Williamson, Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transac-
tion Cost Economic Perspective, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 306, 309 (1999).
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uct, it would still incur reputational costs in having the product la-
beled defective in a products liability suit.
74
These studies throw into doubt both sets of starting assump-
tions held by proponents of enterprise-based liability as an alterna-
tive to a negligence-based torts system. They suggest that some of
the distributive inefficiencies and inequities those proponents asso-
ciated with the negligence-based system and more generally with a
market-based industrial economy, can also be associated with gov-
ernmental distributors of the costs and risks of injuries. More fun-
damentally, they dispute the distributive premises of enterprise-
based liability, suggesting that on the whole market solutions to the
problem of compensating injured persons in a modern economy,
adjusted to take into account corrective justice principles, produce
more efficient and fairer outcomes.
This preference for market solutions seems to be widely
shared in contemporary American political and economic culture. If
the rhetoric of political figures and economic policymakers is taken
as a touchstone, the tendencies of the last twenty years have
shifted decisively in the direction of decreasing the presence of gov-
ernment as a distributor of social and economic risks and benefits,
and buttressing the role of markets in that capacity. Consider, for
example, the comparative stature, between the 1970s and the pres-
ent, of government-based distributive policies in two major areas:
public education and public welfare. In the 1970s governmental
agencies consciously attempted to design programs to spread and
shift the costs of perceived inefficiencies and inequities in the edu-
cational and job markets. 75 Today the welfare benefits approach of
the 1970s has been conspicuously abandoned,7 6 and discussions of
public education begin by conceding that the current system is in
disarray and may only be repaired by increasing the opportunities
to parents to make educational decisions in the same manner as
consumers in other markets.
77
74. See, HUBER, supra note 55, at 155-61.
75. See ROBERT W. JACKMAN, POLITICS AND SOCIAL EQUALITY: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 27-
28 (1975); HAROLD L. WILENSKY, THE WELFARE STATE AND EQUALITY: STRUCTURAL AND
IDEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURES 4-5 (1975).
76. See ANTON ZIJDERVELD, THE WANING OF THE WELFARE STATE: THE END OF
COMPREHENSIVE STATE SUCCOR 93 (1999); Max Sawicky, The New American Devolution: Prob.
lems & Prospects, in THE END OF WELFARE?: CONSEQUENCES OF FEDERAL DEVOLUTION FOR THE
NATION 15-19 (Max B. Sawicky ed., 1999).





Thus the underlying cause of the parallel developments in
academic theory and tort doctrine I have identified, and the central
reason why a negligence-based model of tort liability has unexpect-
edly persisted since the 1980s, is the widespread loss of faith in
government-run distributive solutions to social problems. Tradi-
tional negligence theory has continued to flourish because it is far
less distributive, and requires far less participation from govern-
mental units, than enterprise liability alternatives.
The unexpected persistence of negligence should not suggest
that tort liability is in a period of contraction, as a survey of doc-
trinal developments has shown. Nor should it suggest that negli-
gence-based doctrines have persisted, and enterprise liability-based
alternatives receded in importance, primarily because of the influ-
ence of academic theorists on judicial decisions: if anything, that
influence seems less explicit than it once did. Negligence-based tort
liability can be shown to be more consistent with the assumptions
of welfare economics and corrective justice than enterprise liability,
but that showing raises the broader question why those assump-
tions, rather than the assumptions driving economic and moral
theories furthering distributive ends, have increasingly been
treated as the baseline for evaluating the efficacy of approaches to
tort liability. When one probes that question, it appears to lead to a
counterintuitive conclusion, at least for those who regard life in the
legal academy as increasingly otherworldly and isolated from the
worlds in which contemporary torts cases are argued and decided.
The conclusion is that academic theories, as well as judicial
decisions, more closely track larger changes in the dominant models
of political economy in America than one might suspect. I began
this Essay by suggesting that if legal scholars in the 1970s had
been asked to predict the future course of doctrinal development in
tort law, many would have anticipated a reduced role for traditional
negligence-based theory and an increased role for alternative sys-
tems emphasizing enterprise liability. That prediction would have
been based, to a large extent, on the intuitive attraction many
1970s scholars felt for government-sponsored, distributive ap-
proaches to injury in a modern industrial society. Who would have
suspected that at the moment of that hypothetical prediction the
appeal of those approaches, not only for legal academics and poli-




History confirms that the future is never identical to the
past, and if one reflects upon that fact, it suggests that the future
can never be identical to the present either. But historical actors, at
any given moment in time, have a limited capacity to separate the
weight of their past and the condition of their present from the fu-
ture they imagine, and thus tend to project their sense of their im-
mediate present too vividly onto their anticipated future. The last
twenty years of tort law should be a reminder of how important a
role our current predilections play in our predictions, and, conse-
quently, that our capacity to anticipate our future is even more
limited than our capacity to make sense of our present. It should
also remind us that the question of whether legal academics are
intimately concerned with or relatively indifferent to doctrinal
trends in law is not as important to the course of those trends as
legal academics might like to think. The unexpected persistence of
negligence as the dominant model of tort liability in the last two
decades of the twentieth century, this survey suggests, would very
likely have occurred whether legal scholars endorsed that develop-
ment or not. But, as it turns out, legal scholars would have been
very unlikely not to endorse it.
In thinking about the role of ideas as an "influence" in the
course of legal doctrine, we need to pay attention not merely to the
specific doctrine or policy proposals advanced by judges and com-
mentators, but to the background assumptions driving these pro-
posals. In seeking to make sense of unexpected doctrinal develop-
ments, we need to consider not only paths that were taken but also
paths that were implicitly abandoned. In considering these aban-
doned paths, we will arrive at a deeper, richer sense of how ideas
influence the law.
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